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REFORM PROSECUTORS AND
SEPARATION OF POWERS
LOGAN SAWYER*
Abstract
For decades, state and local prosecutors won election by promising to be
tough on crime. Today, a new breed of prosecutor has gained prominence
by campaigning on, and then implementing, reform agendas. Rather than
emphasize the crimes they plan to prosecute, these reform prosecutors
promise to use their discretion to stop the prosecution of certain crimes and
halt the application of certain sanctions. They base their decision not on a
lack of resources, but rather on a belief that the enforcement of those laws
is unwise or unjust. Critics have decried such policies as both
inappropriate and undemocratic. Prosecutors, critics say, are responsible
for upholding the law, not undermining it, and a blanket refusal to enforce
categories of crimes or apply specific sanctions is effectively rewriting the
law. These critics argue that reform prosecutors thus violate fundamental
separation-of-powers norms.
Though recent state court decisions have lent support to these
arguments, they are deeply mistaken. Critics of reform prosecutors are
quite right that the traditional discretion granted to prosecutors could, if
left unchecked, undermine core separation of powers principles and thereby
threaten both individual liberty and the rule of law. But their
recommendation to resolve that problem with a formal understanding of
separation of powers would prove not just ineffective but even
counterproductive. The parchment barriers they propose will simply
encourage prosecutors to hide their inevitable policy choices from voters
and the other branches. This outcome may in turn undermine the best
available tools to discipline prosecutorial discretion: democratic
accountability provided by the ballot box and checks and balances. Left
unchallenged, these separation-of-powers-based criticisms of reform
prosecutors may spread to other state courts, strengthen political claims
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that reform prosecutors are acting inappropriately, and perhaps even
convince some reform prosecutors to abandon their agendas.
Fortunately, an alternative exists. We can and should encourage all
prosecutors—reform or otherwise—to express their plans openly, confident
that such action is consistent with a well-established understanding of
separation of powers that predates our founding and requires functional
checks and balances rather than a formal separation of functions. We
should encourage this openness because it will both encourage debate over
criminal justice issues that reform prosecutors have helped spark and
subject prosecutorial policies to the voters for approval and other branches
for critique. Such a system of checks and balances represents the best
available protection against the abuse of prosecutorial power.
Introduction
The events in Ferguson, Missouri in 2014 cast a national spotlight on the
problems that can arise when local law enforcement oversteps its
appropriate boundaries. 1 Public attention was riveted by protests—only
sometimes peaceful—against police, prosecutors, and government policies
that many claimed systematically discriminated against the poor and racial
minorities.2 Federal investigations followed, as did increasing scholarly
attention to the significant power exercised by local law enforcement
officials. 3 The uproar produced a political response as well. 4 For decades,

1. CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON POLICE
DEPARTMENT 2 (Mar. 4, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/pressreleases/attachments/2015/03/04/ferguson_police_department_report.pdf
[hereinafter
INVESTIGATION] (“Patrol assignments and schedules are geared toward aggressive
enforcement of Ferguson’s municipal code, with insufficient thought given to whether
enforcement strategies promote public safety or unnecessarily undermine community trust
and cooperation.”).
2. See Alan Blinder & Tanzina Vega, Violence Flares in Ferguson After Appeals for
Harmony, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 17, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/18/us/fergusonmissouri-protests.html; Samantha Storey, Scenes of Chaos Unfold After a Peaceful Vigil in
Ferguson, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 12, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/13/us/after-apeaceful-vigil-in-ferguson-scenes-of-chaos-unfold.html.
3. See INVESTIGATION, supra note 1; see, e.g., Wayne A. Logan, What the Feds Can
Do to Rein in Local Mercenary Criminal Justice, 2018 U. ILL. L. REV. 1731; Sunita Patel,
Toward Democratic Police Reform: A Vision for “Community Engagement” Provisions in
DOJ Consent Decrees, 51 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 793 (2016); Richard Rosenfeld, Ferguson
and Police Use of Deadly Force, 80 MO. L. REV. 1077 (2015).
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state and local prosecutors won election by promising to be tough on
crime. 5 But since Ferguson, a new breed of prosecutor has gained
prominence by campaigning on, and later implementing, reform agendas
based on generally applicable, prospective rules.6
Taking advantage of the traditionally broad meaning of “prosecutorial
discretion,” reform prosecutors have emphasized not the crimes they
promise to prosecute, but instead the crimes they will decline to enforce. 7
The decision not to prosecute certain crimes does not stem from a lack of
resources, but rather the belief that enforcing those laws is unwise or
unjust.8 These reformers do not highlight their close relationship with
police and career prosecutors but instead tout their long-standing conflicts
with them. 9 Aramis Ayala, a Florida prosecutor, received national attention
when she announced her intent not to seek the death penalty in any cases. 10
Mark Gonzales of Nueces County, Texas, also announced he would not
prosecute misdemeanor marijuana charges. 11 Larry Krasner was elected the
4. Charles D. Ellison, The Politics of #Ferguson, POLITICO MAG. (Aug. 14, 2014),
https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/08/is-ferguson-good-for-the-gop-110037;
Wesley Lowery et al., Federal, State Officials Take Sweeping Steps in Response to
Ferguson, Mo., Unrest, WASH. POST (Aug. 14, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.
com/politics/federal-state-officials-take-sweeping-steps-in-response-to-ferguson-mounrest/2014/08/14/7c9c6de0-23f8-11e4-86ca-6f03cbd15c1a_story.html.
5. See, e.g., Jacob Rosenberg, Can a Prosecutor Ever Truly Be Progressive? Ferguson
May Be the Ultimate Test Case, MOTHER J ONES (Apr. 17, 2019), https://www.motherjones.
com/crime-justice/2019/04/progressive-prosecutors-ferguson-wesley-bell-kamala-harriskim-gardener/.
6. See, e.g., Ben Austen, In Philadelphia, a Progressive D.A. Tests the Power—and
Learns the Limits—of His Office, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Oct. 30, 2018), https://www.nytimes.
com/2018/10/30/magazine/larry-krasner-philadelphia-district-attorney-progressive.html
(describing “the Ferguson effect” as “the idea that rank-and-file officers viewed increased
accountability as an attack on their profession”).
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. For example, Larry Krasner, a reform prosecutor in Philadelphia, worked as civil
rights attorney for twenty-five years and sued the Philadelphia Police Department seventyfive times. Id.
10. Katie Mettler, Florida Prosecutor Refuses to Seek Death Penalty for Alleged Cop
Killer, Defies Gov. Rick Scott’s Order to Step Aside, WASH. POST (Mar. 21, 2017, 4:50 AM
CDT), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2017/03/21/floridas-firstblack-prosecutor-a-death-penalty-boycotter-defies-gov-rick-scott/.
11. Timothy Bella, The Most Unlikely D.A. in America, POLITICO M AG. (May 6, 2018),
https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2018/05/06/most-unlikely-district-attorney-inamerica-mark-gonzalez-218322 (“Gonzalez’s résumé puts him in a small but striking new
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District Attorney of Philadelphia after spending a career suing the police. 12
Once elected he promised to prioritize keeping people out of prison and
improving access to services for the mentally ill, drug-addicted, and poor.13
These reform prosecutors have been controversial in both legal and
political debates. Reform prosecutors and their supporters have argued that
they are elected officers who respond to their voters by exercising charging
discretion in a way that is well within the bounds of the authority that the
office has always enjoyed. 14 Their critics, however, have decried their
policies as both unwise and undemocratic. Attorney General William Barr
told the Grand Lodge of the Fraternal Order of Police that reform
prosecutors are “refusing to enforce the law,” and are “demoralizing to law
enforcement and dangerous to public safety.” 15 Among other attacks, critics
argue that when reform prosecutors make a prospective identification of
categories of crimes or sanctions they will not enforce they are no longer
exercising prosecutorial discretion, but are instead violating fundamental

wave of U.S. prosecutors, politically liberal and in some cases even civil-rights advocates,
who’ve been elected to roll back the excesses of the past 20 years’ worth of tough-on-crime
law.”).
12. The Atlantic identified Krasner as a “‘reform-minded’ prosecutor” and part of a
“growing cohort of district and state’s attorneys vowing to overhaul cash bail, abolish the
death penalty, and crack down on police corruption.” Maura Ewing, A ‘Completely
Unelectable’ Progressive Will Probably Win Philadelphia’s DA Race, ATLANTIC (Nov. 6,
2017),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/11/larry-krasner-philadelphiada/544937/?utm_source=fbb. The Philadelphia Fraternal Order of Police fought Krasner’s
election in the general election and the Democratic primary. Holly Otterbein, “Completely
Unelectable” Progressive Larry Krasner Wins DA’s Race, PHILA. MAG. (Nov. 7, 2017, 9:25
PM),
http://www.phillymag.com/news/2017/11/07/larry-krasner-wins-district-attorneygeneral-election/. Its president, John McNesby, ”called Krasner’s candidacy ‘hilarious.’” Id.
13. See Austen, supra note 6.
14. Note, The Paradox of “Progressive Prosecution”, 132 HARV. L. REV. 748, 751–52
(2018) [hereinafter Note, The Paradox] (“Fundamentally, progressive prosecutors seek to
rebalance the use of prosecutorial discretion. Where traditional prosecutors have used their
enforcement powers in a heavy-handed manner to punish marginalized individuals,
progressive prosecutors institute practices that pull back on those punitive measures, or, at
least, divert them.”).
15. Attorney General William P. Barr, Address at the Grand Lodge Fraternal Order of
Police’s 64th National Biennial Conference (Aug. 12, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/opa/
speech/attorney-general-william-p-barr-delivers-remarks-grand-lodge-fraternal-orderpolices-64th.
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separation of powers norms.16 Because prosecutors are responsible for
upholding, not undermining, the law, these critics say blanket refusals to
enforce entire categories of crimes or sanctions effectively change the
law. 17
This criticism has been common among the political opponents of reform
prosecutors. After Aramis Ayala declared she would not seek the death
penalty in any of her cases, the former president of the Florida Prosecuting
Attorneys Association (“FPAA”) said Ayala’s decision was a constitutional
violation.18 “[I]f she wants to change the law,” he said she should “run for
the Legislature.”19 The former president stated that “[a]t the FPAA, our job
as prosecutors is not to make law . . . . It is to take the law the Legislature
makes and enforce [it] in the state.”20 Kim Ogg, the District Attorney for
Harris County, Texas, faced similar criticism after she announced a
marijuana policy that would utilize diversion programs instead of jail
time. 21 In response to Ogg’s decision, the district attorney in a neighboring
county retorted, “Hey, we’re the DAs. We enforce laws, we don’t change
the laws.”22
The frequency with which critics raise these arguments suggests they
may have enough political punch to short-circuit the efforts of reform
prosecutors. This possibility is strengthened by the approach that the
highest courts in two states have taken when faced with such arguments.
Most recently, the Florida Supreme Court upheld a governor’s decision to
remove cases from a prosecutor who had promised not to pursue the death

16. Note, The Paradox, supra note 14, at 753 (“Prosecutors leading these efforts,
however, have been criticized for blatantly neglecting their duties and violating separation of
powers doctrine.”).
17. See Joint Response of Governor Rick Scott and Attorney General Pam Bondi
Opposing Emergency Petition for Extraordinary Writ at 33–34, 36, Ayala v. Scott, 224 So.
3d 755 (Fla. 2017) (No. SC17-653) [hereinafter Joint Response].
18. See Jessica Pishko, Prosecutors Are Banding Together to Prevent Criminal-Justice
Reform, NATION (Oct. 18, 2017), https://www.thenation.com/article/prosecutors-arebanding-together-to-prevent-criminal-justice-reform/ (“The FPAA brief said that Ayala had
violated the separation-of-powers doctrine by effectively setting her own policy.”).
19. Id. (quoting former FPAA President Glenn Hess).
20. Id. (quoting former FPAA President Glenn Hess) (alterations in original).
21. Alan Greenblatt, Law and the New Order: A Fresh Wave of District Attorneys Is
Redefining Justice, GOVERNING (Apr. 2017), http://www.governing.com/topics/publicjustice-safety/gov-district-attorneys-houston-criminal-justice-reform.html.
22. Id. (quoting Montgomery County District Attorney Brett Ligon).
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penalty.23 In doing so, the court drew on an earlier decision by the New
York Court of Appeals that reached a similar result.24
Those state courts are quite right that the traditional discretion granted to
prosecutors could, if left unchecked, undermine core separation of powers
principles and thereby threaten both individual liberty and the rule of law. 25
But the solution they have offered is the wrong one. They insist on a formal
separation of executive power from legislative power that they believe will
protect democratic accountability. But that approach will prove both
ineffective and counterproductive.
The parchment barriers that emerge from a formal understanding of
separation of powers will simply encourage prosecutors to hide their policy
preferences from voters and other branches of government. Such an
approach will undermine, rather than strengthen, the democratic
accountability provided by checks and balances and the ballot box. Perhaps
even more importantly, those decisions might strengthen political claims
that reform prosecutors act inappropriately. They may even convince some
reform prosecutors that they lack the constitutional authority to announce
generally applicable, prospective rules.
To avoid those problems, this Article offers an alternative approach. It
argues that a proper analysis of the potential threat reform prosecutors pose
to the rule of law must start with the recognition that prosecutors legally
can, regularly do, and, in fact, must be authorized to act independent of
legislative intent. 26 Prosecutors, in other words, can and do exercise the
discretion they have traditionally been granted by refusing to enforce
23. Ayala v. Scott, 224 So. 3d 755, 759 (Fla. 2017); see also William P. Marshall,
Break Up the Presidency? Governors, State Attorneys General, and Lessons from the
Divided Executive, 115 YALE L.J. 2446, 2478–79 (2006) (“An independent attorney
general’s ability to do so without imposing substantial burdens on the efficacy of state
government makes the model an attractive candidate for adoption at the federal level.”).
24. Ayala, 224 So. 3d at 758–59 (discussing Johnson v. Pataki, 691 N.E.2d 1002 (N.Y.
1997)).
25. David Alan Sklansky, The Problems with Prosecutors, 1 ANN. REV. CRIMINOLOGY
451, 456 (2018) [hereinafter Sklansky, The Problems]; see also Prosecutors on the Firing
Line: Backlash Against ‘Progressives’ Grows, CRIME REP. (June 24, 2019),
https://thecrimereport.org/2019/06/24/prosecutors-on-the-firing-line-backlash-againstprogressives-grows/; Michael C. Dorf, Prosecutorial Discretion Under Fire, VERDICT (Dec.
3, 2014), https://verdict.justia.com/2014/12/03/prosecutorial-discretion-fire.
26. See generally Stephanos Bibas, The Need for Prosecutorial Discretion,
19 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 369 (2010) [hereinafter Bibas,
Prosecutorial
Discretion].
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statutes passed by previous legislatures and doing so in ways the existing
legislature may disapprove. 27
In making these decisions, prosecutors inevitably make policy decisions
not just about the limits of available resources but also about which laws
they should enforce with those limited resources. 28 As a result of this
reality, the questions that ought to frame courts’ approach to separation of
powers based challenges to reform prosecutors are: (1) whether reform
prosecutors should be able to express their policy choices openly and thus
allow voters and other branches to cabin prosecutorial discretion with
political pressures; and (2) whether allowing them to do so can be squared
with separation of powers norms.
This Article argues that the answer to both questions should be “yes.”
We should encourage prosecutors to subject their plans to voters for
approval and other branches for critique—just as we encourage presidents,
governors, and other elected executive officers to do so. Such disclosures
are necessary because the democratic process and system of checks and
balances represent the best forms of protection against the abuse of
executive power.29 Because well-established understandings of separation
of powers that predate the country’s founding prioritize effective checks
and balances over a formal separation of function, we should also
encourage prosecutors to formally and openly express their policy plans. 30
The Article proceeds as follows: Part I outlines how critics of reform
prosecutors have drawn strength from ambiguities about the role that
prosecutors play in separation of powers theory, which highlights the
important threat that prosecutorial discretion poses to individual liberty and
the rule of law. Prosecutors play multiple roles in the criminal justice
system as they exercise their various duties. First, prosecutors are judicial
27. See 4 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 13.2(e) (4th ed. 2015); see
also David Keenan et al., The Myth of Prosecutorial Accountability After Connick v.
Thompson: Why Existing Professional Responsibility Measures Cannot Protect Against
Prosecutorial Misconduct, 121 YALE L.J. F. 203, 209–13 (2011), https://www.yalelaw
journal.org/pdf/1018_hpkwev93.pdf.
28. LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 27, § 13.2(a); see also Keenan et al., supra note 27, at
210.
29. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 264 (James Madison) (Ian Shapiro ed., Yale Univ. Press
2009) (“If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern
men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary.”). See
generally Martin H. Redish & Elizabeth J. Cisar, “If Angels Were to Govern”: The Need for
Pragmatic Formalism in Separation of Powers Theory, 41 DUKE L.J. 449 (1991).
30. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 29, at 264.
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officers because, as lawyers, they are officers of the court. Second,
prosecutors are executive officers because they have a duty to enforce the
law, and they enjoy discretion in deciding the best way to do so. And third,
prosecutors may be considered legislative officers because the broadly
accepted and historically established scope of prosecutorial discretion
grants prosecutors the authority to decide what laws to enforce and not
enforce. In other words, this grant of authority effectively enables
prosecutors to define the law within their jurisdiction. Critics of reform
prosecutors are thus correct when they claim that the role reform
prosecutors play is at odds with fundamental separation of powers norms
that underlie American principles of self-government enshrined in almost
all state constitutions.31
Part II argues that these critics have, unfortunately, convinced courts to
solve that problem by applying a formal understanding of separation of
powers. Under this formal approach, legislative power is understood as the
power to establish “generally applicable, prospective” legal rules. 32
Conversely, it defines executive power as a power that applies alreadyexisting rules to particular fact situations. Therefore, under a formalistic
approach, while prosecutors are authorized to make case by case
prosecutorial decisions about which individuals to prosecute, they are not
authorized to make generally applicable, prospective rules about what
categories of laws or punishments to enforce. By exceeding the formal
boundaries of the executive power, critics of reform prosecutors claim they
are exercising legislative authority and thus violating separation of powers.
Part II explains why this approach is self-defeating. A core purpose of
separation of powers is to enhance democratic accountability. 33 Denying
prosecutors the power to make clear what policies they will pursue does not
enhance but actually undermines democratic accountability without limiting
prosecutorial discretion in any meaningful way. It does not stop prosecutors
from making a secret decision to avoid enforcing certain classes of laws or
31. See Separation of Powers—An Overview, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (May 1,
2019), http://www.ncsl.org/research/about-state-legislatures/separation-of-powers-an-over
view.aspx (“Forty state constitutions specify that government be divided into three branches:
legislative, executive and judicial.”).
32. See Nathan S. Chapman & Michael W. McConnell, Due Process as Separation of
Powers, 121 YALE L.J. 1672, 1732–55 (2012) (explaining that American courts identified
the law-making power as the power to make rules than were both prospective and general).
33. See Ilan Wurman, Constitutional Administration, 69 STAN. L. REV. 359, 370 (2017)
(describing that separation of powers advances purpose of constitutionalism by distributing
power to prevent tyranny).
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sanctions and later explaining each decision on a case-by-case basis, using
the very same considerations that made them want to adopt a categorical
rule in the first place. For this reason, the formalistic approach actually
encourages elected prosecutors to hide their plans from their voters and
other branches of government. Unfortunately, this result serves to shortcircuit the very mechanisms that ensure democratic accountability:
elections and checks and balances.
Finally, Part III advocates an alternative: the functional approach to
separation of powers. Under this approach, courts should not let their
separation of powers analysis turn on formalistic definitions of “executive”
and “legislative” power. Instead, courts should focus on the functional
purpose of separation of powers, which is to enhance democratic
accountability through a system of checks and balances. From this
perspective, prosecutors should be encouraged to inform voters of the kinds
of laws they will enforce or refuse to enforce. In doing so, prosecutors not
only spark a democratic debate surrounding their own election (which itself
enhances democratic accountability) but may also spark debates among the
different institutions of the state. When a prosecutor is open about his or her
reform agenda, the other branches of government can use their own
authority to change, or support, the prosecutor’s stance. Those actions both
cabin prosecutorial discretion and increase the democratic responsiveness
of government at every level.
I. Prosecutors and the Separation of Powers
Prosecutors have one of the most difficult and important jobs in the
American legal system. They are a critical cog in the enforcement of
criminal law and are thus one of the primary protectors of the rule of law. 34
The actions prosecutors take—or choose not to take—have immediate,
lasting effects on the fairness of our political system. They decide who
should be charged and what those charges should be. 35 They decide which

34. See generally Attorney General Robert H. Jackson, Remarks at the Second Annual
Conference of United States Attorneys (Apr. 1, 1940), in 24 J. AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y 18,
18 (1940) (“The prosecutor has more control over life, liberty, and reputation than any other
person in America.”).
35. AM. BAR ASS’N, CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION §
3-1.2 (4th ed. 2017), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/criminal_justice/standards/
ProsecutionFunctionFourthEdition/ [hereinafter CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS].
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plea bargains to accept and which cases to take to trial.36 At trial, they
represent the government, and at sentencing, their recommendations play a
critical part in determining punishment. 37
In each of those tasks, prosecutors serve multiple constituencies. They
must recognize the suffering of victims of crime and ensure that
perpetrators receive a fair trial and an appropriate sentence. 38 Prosecutors
also serve interests not directly involved in trial, such as preventing racial,
class, or other inappropriate biases and deterring future law-breaking.39 In
serving these constituencies and addressing these concerns, they must, at
times, balance contradictory policy concerns and theories of justice. 40 As
they seek to deter crime, they must weigh concerns of general deterrence
and equality with special deterrence and individuality. 41 Furthermore,
prosecutors must determine what kind of retributive justice, if any, is
needed. And they must do all this with limited resources and often without
full knowledge of the facts.42
A. Theories and Functions of Prosecutorial Power
Formal law, institutional structures, and informal norms governing
prosecutors recognize that clear rules cannot determine the best answer the
complicated, delicate, and important questions prosecutors must resolve on
a daily basis.43 As a result, prosecutors enjoy significant discretion.44 In our

36. Id. § 3-1.3; see also Dan K. Webb & Scott F. Turow, The Prosecutor’s Function in
Sentencing, 13 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 641 (1982) (outlining sentencing considerations followed
by the Office of the U.S. Attorney for the Northern District of Illinois).
37. Webb & Turow, supra note 36, at 644–45.
38. CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS, supra note 35, § 3-1.2(b).
39. Id. § 3-1.6.
40. LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 27, § 13.2(a).
41. Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985) (holding that courts are illequipped to evaluate “the strength of a case, the prosecution’s general deterrence value, the
Government’s enforcement priorities, and the case’s relationship to the Government’s
overall enforcement plan”).
42. Tamara F. Lawson, “Whites Only Tree,” Hanging Nooses, No Crime?: Limiting the
Prosecutorial Veto for Hate Crimes in Louisiana and Across America, 8 U. MD. L.J. RACE,
RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 123, 172 (2008) (“[T]he real dilemma [is] between the
prosecutorial responsibility to equitably enforce the law and the prosecutorial discretion to
efficiently dispatch the government’s limited resources to achieve deterrence, rehabilitation
and retribution.”).
43. See, e.g., Odd v. Malone, 538 F.3d 202, 211 n.3 (3d Cir. 2008) (noting that there is
no bright-line rule when evaluating acts of prosecutorial discretion); see also Bibas,

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol72/iss3/3

2020]

REFORM PROSECUTORS & SEPARATION OF POWERS

613

system, there is very little formal oversight of the decisions prosecutors
make outside of the courtroom—where their most important decisions are
made. 45 The Model Rules of Professional Responsibility only require that
prosecutors make “reasonable” charging decisions,46 which is an almost
meaningless limitation given that a court should dismiss any unreasonable
charge. 47 Federal constitutional guarantees like the Equal Protection Clause
formally limit prosecutors in other ways, such as by prohibiting prosecutors
from acting with racial bias.48 But those guarantees are enforced in a way
that leaves prosecutors almost entirely insulated from liability. 49 For
example, the U.S. Supreme Court has granted prosecutors absolute
immunity from claims brought under § 1983 when they “act[] within the
scope of [their] duties in initiating and pursuing a criminal prosecution.” 50
State constitutional rules provide similar protections. 51
Both courts and scholars have for decades recognized that granting
prosecutors this level of discretion can lead to abuse of power in an area
where abuse is particularly threatening. 52 Prosecutors play a central role,
Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 26, at 372 (“Mechanical rules without humanity grow
inhuman and insane.”).
44. LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 27, § 13.2(a) (“The notion that the prosecuting attorney
is vested with a broad range of discretion in deciding when to prosecute and when not to is
firmly entrenched in American law.”).
45. Id. § 13.2(g) (“[T]here are—as a practical matter—no comparable checks upon [the
prosecutor’s] discretionary judgment of whether or not to prosecute one against whom
sufficient evidence exists.”).
46. MODEL CODE OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.8 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019).
47. See generally Annotation, Power of Court to Enter Nolle Prosequi or Dismiss
Prosecution, 69 A.L.R. 240 (2019).
48. See, e.g., Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 86 (1986) (“Purposeful racial
discrimination in selection of the venire violates a defendant’s right to equal protection
because it denies him the protection that a trial by jury is intended to secure.”) (emphasis
added); see also Scott W. Howe, The Futile Quest for Racial Neutrality in Capital Selection
and the Eighth Amendment Argument for Abolition Based on Unconscious Racial
Discrimination, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2083, 2102 (2004) (“Because the decisions fall to
the subjective judgment of the prosecutor, potential abounds for unconscious racial biases to
influence outcomes.”).
49. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 410 (1976); see also Keenan et al., supra note
27, at 209–20.
50. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 410.
51. LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 27, § 13.5(g).
52. United States v. Ammidown, 497 F.2d 615, 620 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (“[T]he court does
not have primary responsibility, but rather the role of guarding against abuse of prosecutorial
discretion. The rule contemplates exposure of the reasons for dismissal ‘in order to prevent
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after all, in taking from an individual not just liberty and property but even,
in some jurisdictions, life. 53 For elected prosecutors, the political process is
the clearest restraint on their discretion. But commentators widely believe
that elections push prosecutors toward over-enforcement of laws,
particularly on the poor, minorities, and other groups that lack political
power.54 Moreover, many interest groups push prosecutors towards
aggressive enforcement. 55 Victims’ groups certainly support more
abuse of the uncontrolled power of dismissal previously enjoyed by prosecutors,’ and in
pursuance of this purpose ‘to gain the Court’s favorable discretion, it should be satisfied that
the reasons advanced for the proposed dismissal are substantial.’”) (citing United States v.
Greater Blouse, Skirt & Neckwear Contractors Ass’n, 228 F. Supp. 483, 486 (S.D.N.Y.
1964)); see also United States v. Fields, 475 F. Supp. 903, 908 (D.D.C. 1979); Stephanos
Bibas, Prosecutorial Regulation Versus Prosecutorial Accountability, 157 U. PA. L. REV.
959, 961–63 (2009) [hereinafter Bibas, Prosecutorial Regulation]; Angela J. Davis, The
American Prosecutor: Independence, Power, and the Threat of Tyranny, 86 IOWA L. REV.
393, 408–15 (2001); Samuel J. Levine, The Potential Utility of Disciplinary Regulation as a
Remedy for Abuses of Prosecutorial Discretion, 12 DUKE J. CONST . L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 3–5
(2016).
53. See Facts About the Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., https://files.
deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/pdf/FactSheet.f1574350684.pdf (last updated Nov. 21,
2019). States with the death penalty include Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California,
Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi,
Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, and
Wyoming. Id. Additionally, the federal government and the military also have the death
penalty. Id.
54. David Alan Sklansky, The Changing Political Landscape for Elected Prosecutors,
14 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 647, 647 (2017) (“[P]olitics demanded that prosecutors appear tough
and unforgiving.”); see also Angela J. Davis, Prosecution and Race: The Power and
Privilege of Discretion, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 13, 61 (1998) (“Like most politicians,
prosecutors view ‘tough on crime’ themes as the most effective tools to assure re-election.”);
Russell M. Gold, “Clientless” Lawyers, 92 WASH. L. REV. 87, 105–06 (2017)
(“[P]rosecutors have a strong interest in being viewed as tough on crime.”).
55. Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., The “Smart on Crime” Prosecutor, 25 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
905, 912 (2012) (“[E]lected prosecutors, like all elected officials, undoubtedly feel
pressure—either from voters or special interest groups—to be seen as tough on crime.”);
Timothy H. Lee, Don’t Go Wobbly on Criminal Justice, CTR. FOR INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM
(June 2, 2016), http://cfif.org/v/index.php/commentary/54-state-of-affairs/3127-dont-gowobbly-on-criminal-justice; Allan Smith, Progressive DAs Are Shaking Up the Criminal
Justice System. Pro-Police Groups Aren’t Happy, NBC NEWS (Aug. 19, 2019, 11:01 AM
CDT), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/justice-department/these-reform-prosecutors-areshaking-system-pro-police-groups-aren-n1033286; Alex Yablon, The NRA Is Talking Tough
on Crime Again, Bipartisan Prison Sentencing Reform Be Damned, TRACE (June 6, 2016),
https://www.thetrace.org/2016/06/nra-mandatory-minimum-sentencing-reform/.
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aggressive prosecution,56 as do many voters because they do not see
themselves as law-breakers or people who are likely to be falsely accused. 57
They are more concerned with being the victims of crime. These influences
and related dynamics generally push prosecutors to campaign on “tough on
crime” policies and then execute these policies in office.58
Commentators have long worried about the interaction of interest group
politics, prosecutorial discretion, and over-enforcement. However, recent
attention has focused on a new issue: the changing relationship between
prosecutors and separation-of-powers norms and how those norms might be
deployed to address prosecutorial abuses. 59 Because they effectively
exercise executive, judicial, and legislative power, prosecutors present a
separation of powers nightmare in the modern criminal process.
Prosecutors are most often understood to exercise executive authority. 60
As Morrison v. Olson and other authorities have argued, there is substantial
evidence prosecutors have exercised executive power since before our
nation’s founding. 61 Determining when the law has been violated and what
56. See, e.g., Advocacy Group Calls for Changes in Minnesota Law on Rape and
Alcohol, STAR TRIBUNE (Aug. 22, 2018, 8:33 AM), http://www.startribune.com/advocacygroup-calls-for-changes-in-minnesota-law-on-rape-and-alcohol/491409031/.
57. Rachel E. Barkow, Institutional Design and the Policing of Prosecutors: Lessons
from Administrative Law, 61 STAN. L. REV. 869, 873 (2009) (“[M]embers of Congress lack
the incentives to enact these reforms as long as they reap political rewards for looking tough
on crime.”). “Politicians view being tough on crime as a badge of honor that wins points
with voters.” Id. at 873 n.14.
58. Rachel E. Barkow, Administering Crime, 52 UCLA L. REV. 715, 730 (2005)
[hereinafter Barkow, Administering].
59. See Sklansky, The Problems, supra note 25, at 461 (claiming the big problem with
prosecutors is that they straddle many of our legal categories, including law/politics,
court/police, judicial/executive, etc.).
60. Rachel E. Barkow, Separation of Powers and the Criminal Law, 58 STAN. L.
REV. 989, 1044 (2006) (“[T]he virtually unreviewable exercise of prosecutorial discretion
over charging and bargaining also stands in sharp tension with the separation of powers.”)
[hereinafter Barkow, Separation of Powers].
61. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 696 (1988) (“Notwithstanding the fact that the
counsel is to some degree ‘independent’ and free from executive supervision to a greater
extent than other federal prosecutors, in our view these features of the Act give the
Executive Branch sufficient control over the independent counsel to ensure that the President
is able to perform his constitutionally assigned duties.”); see also Smith v. Meese, 821 F.2d
1484, 1490–91 (11th Cir. 1987) (“The prosecutorial function, and the discretion that
accompanies it, is thus committed by the Constitution to the Executive . . . .”). Justice
Scalia’s dissent in Morrison was emphatic, claiming that the “prosecution of crimes is a
quintessentially executive function,” a function that was “always and everywhere”

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2020

616

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72:603

to do about it seems core to “executing the law.” And, at least formally,
prosecutors neither declare generally applicable, prospective rules
governing the polity (as the legislature does) nor exercise final authority to
determine what the law means. 62 Therefore, prosecutors clearly exercise
executive authority. 63
Looking beyond matters of form, however, one can also see that
prosecutors exercise judicial and legislative powers. 64 They have
responsibilities to the court system and to justice that differentiate them
from other executive officers. Because prosecutors are attorneys, they are
officers of the court, bound by additional ethical and professional
responsibilities. Prosecutors, according to the Model Rules of Professional
Responsibility, are “minister[s] of justice.”65 The ABA’s Standards for
Criminal Justice consider prosecutors “administrator[s] of justice” who
have additional responsibilities beyond presenting the strongest possible
controlled by the executive. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 706 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The majority
agreed that there was “no real dispute that the functions performed by the independent
counsel are ‘executive’ in the sense that they are law enforcement functions that typically
have been undertaken by officials within the Executive Branch.” Id. at 691; see also,
Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985) (“[T]he decision of a prosecutor in the
Executive Branch not to indict . . . has long been regarded as the special province of the
Executive Branch . . . .”); Stephanie A.J. Dangel, Is Prosecution a Core Executive Function?
Morrison v. Olson and the Framers’ Intent, 99 YALE LAW J. 1069, 1070 (1990) (“The
Framers intended that prosecution would be an executive, but not necessarily presidential,
function.”).
62. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically the
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”).
63. In the federal system this is black letter law. See, e.g., Morrison, 487 U.S. at 691
(“There is no real dispute that the functions performed by the independent counsel are
‘executive’ in the sense that they are law enforcement functions that typically have been
undertaken by officials within the Executive Branch.”); Heckler, 470 U.S. at 832 (“[W]e
recognize that an agency’s refusal to institute proceedings shares to some extent the
characteristics of the decision of a prosecutor in the Executive Branch not to indict—a
decision which has long been regarded as the special province of the Executive
Branch . . . .”); Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) (“The United States Attorney
is the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose
obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose
interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice
shall be done.”); United States v. Martin, 287 F.3d 609, 623 (7th Cir. 2002) (“The decision
to indict, allege specific charges, or dismiss charges is inherently an exercise of executive
power, and the prosecutor has broad discretion in these matters.”).
64. See Sklansky, The Problems, supra note 25, at 456.
65. MODEL CODE OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.8 cmt. 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983).
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case to the court.66 They should not just seek to convict the guilty, but also
protect the innocent, consider the interests of victims and witnesses, and
respect the constitutional rights of suspects and defendants. 67
Additionally, some historical analyses have suggested that prosecutors
were considered judicial rather than executive officers at the founding. 68
Perhaps most importantly, prosecutors operate in an institutional context
that effectively places them in a judicial role. 69 In the contemporary
criminal justice system, the vast majority of defendants choose to accept a
plea rather than go to trial.70 They fear that if they go to trial, prosecutors
will use their discretion to bring more charges and impose longer
sentences.71 As a result, defendants and their attorneys must argue the
substantive merits of their case before the prosecutor, who, despite being
the opposing counsel, effectively determines whether the defendant broke
the law and whether the sentence is appropriate. 72 Because more than 95%
of convictions are the result of a plea, 73 Rachel Barkow has argued that our
criminal justice system has become “an administrative system where the

66. CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS, supra note 35, § 3-1.2 (noting it is a prosecutor’s
primary duty to “seek justice . . . not merely convict”).
67. Id.
68. See Keenan et al., supra note 27, at 213 & n.53 (citing that at least as early as 1854
prosecutors were exempt as judicial officers from liability).
69. Id. at 214.
70. NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS, THE TRIAL PENALTY : THE SIXTH
AMENDMENT RIGHT TO TRIAL ON THE VERGE OF EXTINCTION AND HOW TO SAVE IT 14 (2018),
https://www.nacdl.org/getattachment/95b7f0f5-90df-4f9f-9115-520b3f58036a/the-trialpenalty-the-sixth-amendment-right-to-trial-on-the-verge-of-extinction-and-how-to-saveit.pdf (“In 2016, 97.3% of defendants in the federal criminal justice system opted to concede
their guilt. And in 2017, that number held steady at 97.2%.”); Barkow, Separation of
Powers, supra note 60, at 1047 (“[I]t is not surprising that almost all convictions are the
result of pleas.”); Emily Yoffe, Innocence Is Irrelevant, ATLANTIC (Sept. 2017),
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2017/09/innocence-is-irrelevant/534171/
(“The vast majority of felony convictions are now the result of plea bargains—some 94
percent at the state level, and some 97 percent at the federal level. Estimates for
misdemeanor convictions run even higher.”).
71. See NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS, supra note 70, at 19–22.
72. Barkow, Separation of Powers, supra note 60, at 1047; Gerard E. Lynch, Screening
Versus Plea Bargaining: Exactly What Are We Trading Off?, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1399, 1403–
04 (2003).
73. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
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prosecutor combines both executive and judicial power—posing the very
danger the Framers tried to prevent.”74
Prosecutors’ authority to decide which laws will and will not be enforced
could also, under some circumstances, constitute the exercise of legislative
power. If law is nothing more than a prediction of when and in what ways
the power of courts will be deployed,75 then prosecutors legislate every time
they set generally applicable, prospective rules about who to prosecute,
rather than determine whether to prosecute based on a case-by-case analysis
of individual facts. When prosecutors make informed, reasoned decisions
on the basis of individual facts, they fulfill their sworn obligation to uphold
the law. 76 But when they make generally applicable, prospective rules, they
arguably change the law and thus encroach on the authority of the
legislature.
The emergence of reform prosecutors has raised concerns about the
prosecutor’s fit with separation of powers principles. Namely, critics of
reform prosecutors have used those principles to attack reform prosecutors,
and state courts have embraced their arguments.77 The primary line of
attack has been that by promising not to prosecute certain crimes or pursue
certain sanctions, reform prosecutors are not only exceeding their executive
power but also encroaching on the legislative power of the state. This
encroachment, in turn, undermines core democratic and rule-of-law
values. 78

74. Barkow, Separation of Powers, supra note 60, at 1048; see also John A. Horowitz,
Prosecutorial Discretion and the Death Penalty: Creating a Committee to Decide Whether
to Seek the Death Penalty, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 2571, 2577 n.41 (1997) (arguing that
because of the prevalence of plea bargaining, prosecutors in fact do exercise judicial power
and therefore are taking on a role “inconsistent with the most fundamental principles of our
system of justice and our basic notations of fair play and efficient criminal administration”)
(quoting James Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of Prosecutorial Power, 94 HARV. L. REV.
1521, 1554 (1981)).
75. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 461
(1897) (“The prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing more pretentious, are
what I mean by the law.”).
76. See Zachary S. Price, Law Enforcement as Political Question, 91 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1571, 1572–76 (2016) (discussing the broad legal requirements surrounding
prosecutorial decisions).
77. See supra notes 16–17 and accompanying text.
78. See supra notes 16–17 and accompanying text.

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol72/iss3/3

2020]

REFORM PROSECUTORS & SEPARATION OF POWERS

619

B. The Judicial Diagnosis of Reform Prosecutors’ Policies
So far, the highest profile case to reach state courts is Ayala v. Scott.79 In
that case, an elected Florida prosecutor, Aramis Ayala, announced that she
would not pursue the death penalty for any crime. 80 Her decision sparked
waves of criticism, 81 culminating in Florida Governor Rick Scott’s decision
to use his constitutional authority to reassign criminal cases from local
prosecutors when he had “good and sufficient reason.” 82 Governor Scott
argued that he had good reason to reassign the cases because Ayala was
exercising legislative power rather than executive power. 83 Her categorical
refusal to pursue the death penalty eliminated a sanction created by the state
legislature without considering the criteria prescribed by the legislature in
each individual case. 84 Because the executive power that prosecutors
exercise includes a duty to apply the law to the facts of each case, the
Governor argued that her inaction was effectively a nullification of the law
and not a subsidiary component of her executive authority. 85 The court
concluded that refusing to engage in a case-by-case analysis is a refusal to
apply the law and is thus equivalent to ignoring or rewriting it, a power
reserved to the legislature. 86
Therefore, in Ayala, the Florida Supreme Court adopted the Governor’s
position and held that he did not exceed his authority by reassigning
Ayala’s death-penalty-eligible cases. 87 Under Florida law, the court
reasoned, the Governor has “supreme executive power and is charged with
the duty” to ensure that laws are faithfully executed.88 Accordingly, the
governor is granted broad authority to assign state attorneys to other
circuits.89 While Governor Scott received deference from the court, the
Florida Supreme court also found that Ayla’s conduct violated the
79. 224 So. 3d 755 (Fla. 2017).
80. Id. at 756.
81. Frances Robles, Lock ‘Em Up? Prosecutors Who Say ‘Not So Fast’ Face a
Backlash, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 30, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/30/us/aramisayala-prosecutors-death-penalty.html.
82. Ayala, 224 So. 3d at 757 (quoting the relevant Florida statutes).
83. See Joint Response, supra note 17, at 33–34.
84. Id. at 37.
85. Id. at 33–34.
86. See Ayala, 224 So. 3d at 758–60 (citing Johnson v. Pataki, 691 N.E.2d 1002 (N.Y.
1997)).
87. Id. at 759–60.
88. Id. at 757.
89. Id. at 757–58.
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separation of powers principles.90 By declining to exercise her discretion,
the court held she was not exercising executive power but was instead
exercising legislative power. 91
The New York Court of Appeals took a similar approach in Johnson v.
Pataki.92 According to that court, the adoption of a blanket policy against
the death penalty was, in effect, a refusal to exercise discretion and
comparable to “a functional veto of state law authorizing prosecutors to
pursue the death penalty in appropriate cases.” 93 In Johnson, the court
reasoned that “the delineation of law enforcement functions has
consistently been left to the legislature” and that the legislature clearly had
not given the District Attorney authority to adopt a blanket policy and
thereby refuse to exercise discretion. 94 As in Ayala, the court in Johnson
held that “where the state constitution or the legislature has empowered the
governor to act,” judicial review of a governor’s discretion is extremely
limited, and the authority to counter governors’ actions lies with the people
at the polls. 95 Therefore, these cases strongly emphasize the general formal
understanding of the role of prosecutors as executive actors, limited in their
capacity to enter the legislative sphere.
II. The Failures of the Formal Fix
A. Understanding the Formal Approach
The embrace of separation of powers arguments by courts and critics of
reform prosecutors is both ironic and unfortunate. It is ironic because
reform prosecutors are using their authority to reduce the threat the state
poses to individual liberty—the exact purpose the separation of powers is
meant to serve. 96 The approach to separation of powers issues the critics of
reform prosecutors recommend will have the effect of increasing, rather
than decreasing, the threat prosecutors pose to individual liberty by

90. See id. at 758–59.
91. See id.
92. 691 N.E.2d 1002 (N.Y. 1997).
93. Id. at 1007.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 1005.
96. See generally Rebecca L. Brown, Separated Powers and Ordered Liberty, 139 U.
PA. L. REV. 1513 (1991); see also supra notes 16, 25 and accompanying text.
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encouraging prosecutors to conceal their prosecutorial policies. 97 In
addition, the approach they have taken is unfortunate because it is likely to
reduce, rather than augment, the accountability of prosecutors. 98
Consequently, the critics’ approach will enable prosecutors to pose an even
greater threat to liberty, fairness, and justice.
These judges and critics have adopted a formal approach to separation of
powers. As the decisions in Ayala and Johnson indicate, a formal approach
suggests that prosecutors cannot regulate their discretion with publicly
announced generally applicable, prospective rules without encroaching on
the authority of the state legislature. 99 But in the context of elected state
prosecutors, the formal approach will not accomplish critics’ goals because
it cannot actually prevent prosecutors from using such rules. The
complexities inherent in the prosecutor’s role require that they be left with
more than enough discretion to apply such rules implicitly by using caseby-case determinations.
A world in which prosecutors feel compelled to conceal their motives
from the public and other branches of government is worse in every way. It
reduces the availability of information that voters need to make informed
choices, limits the control the democratic process can exert over
prosecutors, makes it more difficult for other branches of government to
provide checks and balances to prosecutorial discretion, and cuts short
opportunities for fruitful debate over the best approach to criminal justice.
What the state courts in Ayala and Johnson ultimately found
inappropriate is that the prosecutors in each case established generally
applicable, prospective rules to govern their application of the death
penalty.100 In both cases, the prosecutors claimed that their prosecutorial
discretion—an executive power—permitted adopting such rules. 101
Therefore, the prosecutors argued, the governor could not interfere with
their decisions because their decisions were an exercise of prosecutorial
discretion.102 The courts rejected those arguments because the application of
97. See sources cited supra note 25; see also Josie Duffy Rice, Prosecutors Aren’t Just
Enforcing the Law – They’re Making It, APPEAL (Apr. 20, 2018), https://theappeal.org/
prosecutors-arent-just-enforcing-the-law-they-re-making-it-d83e6e59f97a/.
98. Rice, supra note 97.
99. Both prosecutors publicly announced policy decisions, and the courts found that
both prosecutors overstepped their discretionary authority. See Ayala v. Scott, 224 So. 3d
755, 759 (Fla. 2017); Johnson, 691 N.E.2d at 1006–07.
100. Ayala, 224 So. 3d at 759; Johnson, 691 N.E.2d at 1004.
101. Ayala, 224 So. 3d at 758; Johnson, 691 N.E.2d at 1005–06.
102. Ayala, 224 So. 3d at 758; Johnson, 691 N.E.2d at 1005.
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generally applicable, prospective rules is not an exercise of discretion but
rather a refusal to exercise that discretion. 103 The courts reasoned that
decisions not to enforce certain laws or proscribe certain punishments were
instead an exercise of legislative power that violated separation of powers
principles.104
The centrality of those arguments in Ayala and Johnson means that the
court’s analysis in both cases would have been different had the governors
in each case sought to remove authority from the locally elected prosecutors
because they disagreed with the individualized, fact-based determinations
for a single prosecution, or even a series of prosecutions. But whether or
not these two individual cases would have been resolved in a different way
under different facts is immaterial to the following points. First, the formal
understanding of separation of powers those courts adopted is likely to
invalidate generally applicable, prospective rules governing a prosecutor’s
discretion because those courts characterize those rules as exercises of
legislative power, not exercises of executive power. Second, this legal
regime is counterproductive even to the goal it is trying to advance.
A formal approach to separation of powers is regularly employed and, in
some contexts, may have advantages that outweigh its costs. It envisions
strict separation between the legislative, executive, and judicial functions
through the use of categorical, bright-line rules.105 A formal approach
defines certain categories of authority as legislative, executive, or judicial
and then seeks to ensure those powers are wielded exclusively by the
corresponding branch.106 Considerations of efficiency or effectiveness are
irrelevant under the formal approach. If a court reviewing the exercise of a
given power finds that the wrong branch of government is exercising it,
then the use of that power will be struck down—regardless of how efficient
the arrangement might be.107
B. The Supreme Court’s Implication of a Formal Approach to Separation of
Powers
The U.S. Supreme Court has invoked formalistic arguments when it was
concerned that one branch was “aggrandizing” itself at the expense of
another branch, and the Court strikes down exercises of power that extend
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

See Ayala, 224 So. 3d at 758–59; Johnson, 691 N.E.2d at 1007.
See Ayala, 224 So. 3d at 759 & n.2; Johnson, 691 N.E.2d at 1007.
Barkow, Separation of Powers, supra note 60, at 997.
Id.
Id.
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beyond those traditionally held by a given branch. 108 Justices have also
supported a formal understanding of separation of powers by examining the
text of the U.S. Constitution.109 Justice Scalia’s dissent in Morrison v.
Olson is one such example. 110
In Morrison, Justice Scalia dissented because he thought a legislative
scheme that prevented the President from directly removing special
prosecutors violated separation of powers. 111 He based his conclusion on
the Vesting Clause of the Constitution, which provides that “[t]he executive
Power shall be vested in a President of the United States.”112 This clause,
108. See Peter L. Strauss, Formal and Functional Approaches to Separation-of-Powers
Questions—A Foolish Inconsistency?, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 488, 501–11 (1987) (discussing
at length how justices of the U.S. Supreme Court have used the concept of “aggrandizement”
in their opinions) (quoting Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 727 (1986)); see also T.J.
HALSTEAD, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30249, THE SEPARATION OF POWERS DOCTRINE : AN
OVERVIEW OF ITS RATIONALE AND APPLICATION 14 (1999), https://digital.library.unt.
edu/ark:/67531/metadc809717/m1/18/?q=origination%20clause (“With its decision in
Chadha, the Supreme Court established that Congress may exercise its legislative authority
only ‘in accord with a single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered procedure,’
namely bicameral passage and presentation. This formal stance by the Court evidences the
traditional concern regarding the potential aggrandizement of the legislative branch.”)
(footnote omitted) (quoting INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983)).
109. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 443 (1965) (“The doctrine of
separated powers is implemented by a number of constitutional provisions, some of which
entrust certain jobs exclusively to certain branches, while others say that a given task is not
to be performed by a given branch. For example, Article III’s grant of ‘the judicial Power of
the United States’ to federal courts has been interpreted both as a grant of exclusive
authority areas, and as a limitation upon the judiciary, a declaration that certain tasks are not
to be performed by the courts.”) (internal citations omitted) (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5
U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 151 (1803)); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579,
587–88 (1952) (“In the framework of our Constitution, the President’s power to see that the
laws are faithfully executed refutes the idea that he is to be a lawmaker. The Constitution
limits his functions in the lawmaking process to the recommending of laws he thinks wise
and the vetoing of laws he thinks bad. And the Constitution is neither silent nor equivocal
about who shall make laws which the president is to execute. The first section of the first
article says that ‘All Legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the
United States.’ After granting many powers to the Congress, Article I goes on to provide that
Congress may ‘make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into
Execution the foregoing Powers and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the
Government of the United States, or in any Department or Office thereof.’”) (quoting U.S.
CONST. art. I.).
110. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 697–734 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
111. See id. at 704–05 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
112. Id. at 705 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1).
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Scalia reasoned, “does not mean some of the executive power, but all of the
executive power.”113 Accordingly, Justice Scalia posited the following:
[T]he decision of the Court of Appeals invalidating the present
statute must be upheld on fundamental separation-of-powers
principles if the following two questions are answered
affirmatively: (1) Is the conduct of a criminal prosecution (and
of an investigation to decide whether to prosecute) the exercise
of purely executive power? (2) Does the statute deprive the
President of the United States of exclusive control over the
exercise of that power? Surprising to say, the Court appears to
concede an affirmative answer to both questions, but seeks to
avoid the inevitable conclusion that since the statute vests some
purely executive power in a person who is not the President of
the United States it is void.114
This argument is formal because it rests on the definition of legal and
constitutional terms and not on the practical consequences of assigning a
particular power to a particular institutional actor.
Just because a formal approach to the separation of powers prevents
judges from considering the efficacy of the challenged arrangement does
not, of course, mean the approach itself is necessarily dysfunctional. Formal
approaches to applying doctrine have a variety of advantages. 115 Most
importantly, in the context of separation of powers, formal approaches can
help ensure that a court’s recognition that an innovative institutional
structure makes government authority more efficient or effective does not
blind it to the threat that new structure poses for democratic accountability
and individual liberty. In fact, Rachel Barkow has recently argued that, at
the federal level, a formal approach to the separation of powers in the
criminal law is preferable for textual, historical, and functional reasons. 116
But her arguments do not necessarily apply to state systems for two

113. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
114. Id. at 705 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
115. See, e.g., FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES (1991) (discussing the
advantages and disadvantages of decision-making by formal rule rather than flexible
standard).
116. Barkow, Separation of Powers, supra note 60, at 1050 (noting that her argument
“applies only to the federal government”).
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reasons.117 First, states are constrained by the separation-of-powers
principles in their own constitutions, not those in the federal constitution. 118
Second, the institutional context in which most state prosecutors operate is
different than the federal context. 119 State prosecutors, unlike federal
prosecutors, are elected, and this difference has important implications for
the separation of powers analysis. 120
The most worrisome impact of applying a formal separation-of-powers
analysis in cases involving reform prosecutors is its inability to prevent
prosecutors from secretly following their generally applicable, prospective
rules. In other words, prosecutors can refuse to enforce certain crimes or
proscribe certain punishments according to tacit reform rules while
outwardly maintaining that they are exercising discretion on a case-by-case
basis. This workaround is feasible because the legal rules and professional
guidance that govern prosecutorial discretion provide little oversight for
prosecutors.121 And it is important for courts to defer to prosecutorial
decisions. The prosecutor’s job is simply too difficult and too
interconnected with complicated policy considerations for close judicial
oversight.122 As a result, if an elected prosecutor decides not to pursue death
117. See id. (“[T]o the extent that similar structural abuses exist at the state level, this
argument might not address them.”).
118. There are multiple reasons Barkow’s argument may not determine the answer to the
question presented here. The most obvious is that state and federal constitutions both use
separation of powers concepts. Jim Rossi, Institutional Design and the Lingering Legacy of
Antifederalist Separation of Powers Ideals in the States, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1167, 1190–91
(1999) (“Separation of powers is a bedrock principle to the constitutions of each of the fifty
states. . . . The overwhelming majority of modern state constitutions contain a strict
separation of powers clause.”). Those constitutions are, of course, different, as Barkow
recognizes. Barkow, Separation of Powers, supra note 60, at 1050–51 (“[A]rguments for
using a bright-line approach to the separation of powers might not apply at the state level.”).
119. Rossi, supra note 118, at 1188 (“[T]he U.S. Constitution fails to dictate a specific
form of separation of powers for state governments.”).
120. Todd Lochner, Strategic Behavior and Prosecutorial Agenda Setting in United
States Attorneys’ Offices: The Role of U.S. Attorneys and Their Assistants, 23 JUST. SYS. J.
271, 276–81 (2002) (discussing specific policy and other rationales at play in the U.S.
Attorney’s Office).
121. See Keenan et al., supra note 27, at 210 (“[P]rosecutors’ offices enjoy considerable
autonomy in shaping their internal policies. Although judicial oversight should theoretically
check this autonomy, courts are generally loath to interfere with the inner workings of a
coordinate branch of government.”).
122. See Austin Sarat & Conor Clarke, Beyond Discretion: Prosecution, the Logic of
Sovereignty, and the Limits of Law, 33 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 387, 398 (2008) (“[T]he Appeals
Court for the District of Columbia explained, it is ‘not a matter within the jurisdiction of the
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penalty cases, “[c]ourts are, by their own admission, helpless” in reviewing
prosecutorial decisions.123 Nor could courts effectively force prosecutors to
prosecute misdemeanor marijuana cases or any other class of punishments
or crimes.124
Moreover, judicial oversight, in the form of separation-of-powers norms
that prevent a prosecutor from announcing a generally applicable,
prospective rule, would almost certainly interfere with whatever capability
the democratic process has to cabin the discretion of prosecutors. If courts
tell elected prosecutors and political candidates that announcing and
applying generally applicable, prospective rules to guide their discretion
violates state separation of powers norms, future officials and candidates
will respond by keeping those rules secret. The loser will be the voting
public, who will have less information in deciding their vote for one of the
most important elected officials.
This lack of disclosure not only robs voters of information they deserve,
but also reduces the democratic constraint on prosecutors by giving voters
the information they need to hold candidates accountable for their policies
while in office. 125 It also interferes with broader debates on ways to
improve the criminal justice system outside of the jurisdiction. 126 The best
that could be said against such a rule is that it may create bureaucratic waste
for prosecutors who want to use rules to guide their decisions, as line
prosecutors propose strategies based on case by case analysis that their
elected boss will not follow. Those offices, like other government offices,
are bureaucracies, and all bureaucracies operate by rule. That possibility,
however, hardly seems worth the costs such an approach would impose.
Analyzing the activities of reform prosecutors with a formal approach to
separation of powers may seem the best way to address prosecutorial overreach, but its actual effect will be to conceal prosecutorial policies from
voters and other governmental institutions.

judicial branch of this government’ to issue injunctions against prosecutors. This reflects not
just the separation of powers, but the practical unsuitability of reviewing a prosecutor’s
reasoning.”) (quoting Moses v. Katzenbach, 342 F.2d 931, 931 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (per curiam)
(Wright, J., concurring)).
123. Id.
124. See id. at 400.
125. Sklansky, The Problems, supra note 25, at 463–64.
126. See id.
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III. The Functional Fix
A. Formalism Versus Functionalism
Fortunately, a formal separation-of-powers analysis is not the only way
to approach prosecutors when they use generally applicable, prospective
rules. Instead, courts could adopt a functionalist approach to separation of
powers and consider not just the definition of executive, legislative, and
judicial power but also how those powers should interact to produce a
government that is both efficient and respectful of the liberty of its citizens.
Such an approach would allow elected state prosecutors to both apply
generally applicable, prospective rules that guide their discretion while in
office and discuss them on the campaign trail. Allowing them to do so will
both make prosecutorial offices more efficient and better protect individual
liberty by offering ways to limit that discretion. Under this approach,
prosecutors will be held accountable by voters, who will have more
information about what a prosecutor will do. And they will also be more
constrained by the checks and balances that other branches of government
provide because those branches will have a clearer understanding of the
prosecutor’s policy preferences.
Formalism emphasizes a “definitional” understanding of separation of
powers.127 Exercises of government authority are defined as “legislative,”
“executive,” or “judicial,” and then the exercise of that power is limited to
the corresponding branch.128 But formalism is not the only approach courts
have taken to separation of powers issues. Critics of formalism argue it is
unrealistic and often harmful.129 They have championed instead a more
127. Lee S. Liberman, Morrison v. Olson: A Formalistic Perspective on Why the Court
Was Wrong, 38 AM. U. L. REV. 313, 343 (1989).
128. Id. (“A formalist decision uses a syllogistic, definitional approach to determining
whether a particular exercise of power is legislative, executive, or judicial. It assumes that all
exercises of power must fall into one of these categories . . . .”).
129. Justice Jackson famously derided the formal approach in Youngstown Sheet & Tube
Co. v. Sawyer:
The actual art of governing under our Constitution does not and cannot
conform to judicial definitions of the power of any of its branches based on
isolated clauses or even single Articles torn from context. While the
Constitution diffuses power the better to secure liberty, it also contemplates
that practice will integrate the dispersed powers into a workable government.
It enjoins upon its branches separateness but interdependence, autonomy but
reciprocity.
343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
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pragmatic approach that recognizes that the strict separation of powers
called for under the definitional model may impede the proper functioning
of government. 130 The former view is traditionally termed “formalism,”
while the latter model is typically labeled “functionalism.” 131
Functionalism rejects as unrealistic the idea that the powers wielded by
the different branches of government can be clearly defined, properly
categorized, and then accurately assigned to the proper branch in ways that
will create a government sufficiently active, effective, and respectful of the
rights of its citizens. 132 Functionalism is instead characterized by the use of
balancing tests that tolerate the exercise of one branch’s power by another
branch if that exercise does not impede or usurp the central duties of the
former branch.133 Rather than looking to the judiciary to ensure each branch
exercises only the proper type of authority, functionalism looks to checks
and balances to protect liberty and property while also allowing for
effective government action.134 Checks and balances allow each branch to
use the power granted to it to safeguard its own authority. 135 The
mechanisms of checks and balances include the desire of those within each
branch to protect their own interests and structural checks—such as
impeachment provisions or appointments dependent on another branch. 136

130. See Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Transcending Formalism and Functionalism in
Separation-of-Powers Analysis: Reframing the Appointments Power After Noel Canning, 64
DUKE L.J. 1513, 1545–50 (2015).
131. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Relationships Between Formalism and Functionalism in
Separation of Powers Cases, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 21, 21 (1998) (“Formalism might
be associated with bright-line rules that seek to place determinate, readily enforceable limits
on public actors. Functionalism, at least as an antipode, might be associated with standards
or balancing tests that seek to provide public actors with greater flexibility.”).
132. Id. at 21–22.
133. Id. at 21; see also Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 694–95 (1988) (discussing what
features of a potential violation of separation of powers the Court has looked at when
determining whether the principle has been violated); Linda D. Jellum, “Which Is to Be
Master,” the Judiciary or the Legislature? When Statutory Directives Violate Separation of
Powers, 56 UCLA L. REV. 837, 870–76 (2009) (detailing the differences between the two
approaches and identifying key functional approach principles).
134. See Eskridge, supra note 131, at 21–22.
135. Michael C. James, A Comparative Analysis of the Right to Privacy in the United
States, Canada and Europe, 29 CONN. J. INT’L L. 257, 285 (2013).
136. See Thomas O. Sargentich, The Contemporary Debate About Legislative-Executive
Separation of Powers, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 430, 433 (1987) (highlighting the importance of
checks and balances within the functional model).
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Through these checks and balances, the branches maintain their
independence, even while sharing powers in order to govern effectively. 137
Applying a functional approach to the rule-based decision-making of
reform prosecutors leads to a different outcome than the formal approach
state courts have begun to apply. Under a formalistic approach, a
prosecutor’s blanket rule not to enforce certain crimes or punishments is
considered a usurpation of legislative power. Functionalism, on the other
hand, would ask whether the use of such rules allows the effective exercise
of the power granted to prosecutors and whether it would interfere with the
effective operation of the powers granted to the legislature or the judiciary.
Although state courts to date seem to have been concerned that the exercise
of such power by reform prosecutors would interfere with the legislature’s
authority, that assumption is misplaced. Instead, granting prosecutors such
power would hardly, if at all, increase the power they already exercise or
decrease the power the legislature exercises.138 It would, however, allow
voters to better understand the choices their elected officials make, which in
turn strengthens democratic checks on prosecutorial authority and reduces
the threat that power poses to individual liberty.
B. Functionalism Bolsters Democratic Decision-Making and Checks and
Balances
State courts, including both the Florida Supreme Court139 and the New
York Court of Appeals,140 have indicated that prosecutors undermine
legislative authority when they use rule-based decision making. This
concern is not entirely without merit. Legal realism has long taught that
“law-on-the-books” is much less important than “law-in-action,” and when
prosecutors announce they will not enforce a particular statute, that
announcement constitutes the law in that jurisdiction for many of the most
important practical purposes. 141 There are, of course, differences between a
prosecutor choosing not to prosecute a crime and an act not being a crime,
and it is much easier for a prosecutor to change his or her mind than a
legislature. While the Ex Post Facto Clause protects individuals whose

137. See id.
138. See id. at 471–72.
139. Ayala v. Scott, 224 So. 3d 755, 758–59 (Fla. 2017).
140. Johnson v. Pataki, 691 N.E.2d 1002, 1007 (N.Y. 1997).
141. See Frederick Schauer, Legal Realism Untamed, 91 TEX. L. REV. 749, 752–56
(2013) (providing the basics of legal realism).
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conduct constitutes a violation of a later-enacted law from prosecution, 142
the same is not true for individuals who violate a law during a prosecutor’s
period of nonenforcement. Because their conduct was illegal at the time, it
is punishable notwithstanding any pre-existing prosecutorial policy.
At first glance, this can appear to represent a significant interference with
legislative authority. The difficulty with this argument, however, is that
prosecutors already can, and regularly do, frustrate legislative intent in this
way. 143 Granting prosecutors the discretion they need to use limited
resources effectively means granting them the largely unreviewable
discretion to choose to prosecute one crime, or set of crimes, over
another.144 Thus, the question here is not whether prosecutors can frustrate
the legislative intent. They can. Instead, the question is whether they should
be permitted—or even encouraged—to be clear about what they are doing.
A functional analysis suggests that the answer is clearly “yes” because
such clarity provides additional information to voters who can exert at least
some control over prosecutorial discretion. There are reasonable doubts
about the extent to which the democratic process can effectively constrain
prosecutorial discretion.145 But the fact that voters are not as involved and
attentive as they should be does not mean they cannot provide a useful
check on prosecutorial abuse. It is certainly better to empower voters to
exercise their check by providing them additional information. 146
It is of course possible that the additional clarity provided by allowing
prosecutors to make generally applicable, prospective rules to govern their
discretion could lead to more, not less, prosecution. Stephanos Bibas has
recognized the possibility that more public involvement will result in more
punishment, but he finds that possibility overblown. 147 He also forcefully
argues that, in a democracy, voters have a right to influence the prosecutors
142. E.g., Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 169–70 (1925).
143. See Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., Prosecutorial Nullification, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1243, 1244–
45 (2011).
144. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
145. See Barkow, Administering, supra note 58, at 723–30; Bibas, Prosecutorial
Regulation, supra note 52, at 983–89; Ronald F. Wright, How Prosecutor Elections Fail Us,
6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 581, 591 (2009) (“Unfortunately, prosecutor elections do not deliver
on their promise. They do not assure that the public knows and approves of the basic policy
priorities and implementation of policy in the prosecutor’s office.”).
146. See Bibas, Prosecutorial Regulation, supra note 52, at 989 (“Better information
might also help voters to monitor their agents.”).
147. Id. at 990 (“Voters often seem to be reflexively punitive, and more democracy might
seem to lead to more overpunishment. While understandable, this concern is overblown.”).
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they elect.148 If we hope to help voters protect their own liberty by checking
the discretion of prosecutors, a functional approach to separation of powers
will help accomplish that goal.
A functional approach to separation of powers can also protect liberty by
allowing other branches of government to limit the discretion of elected
prosecutors. The different branches of government have a wide variety of
formal and informal tools they can use to discipline the other branches. 149
As James Madison wrote, the structure of government is built such that
“[a]mbition [could] be made to counteract ambition” 150—to the benefit of
good government and individual liberty. At the federal level, some of the
formal powers that permit the branches to check one another include that
executive nominees can ascend to their office only with the consent of the
Senate and that Supreme Court justices are nominated by the Executive and
confirmed by the Senate.151 The Senate, in both those circumstances, could
decline to confirm a candidate who it believed would pursue policies that
trenched on the legislative power.
States have similar systems, many of which are directly applicable the
power of prosecutors.152 Of course, state constitutions vary widely in their
scope and application, but in many, the legislature controls important parts
of the processes for electing local prosecutors. 153 For example, legislatures
generally play a primary role in deciding who elects prosecutors, how they
are elected, whether they can run for re-election, and even whether they are
elected.154 In addition, prosecutors’ salaries are often set by the state
legislature.155 Perhaps most importantly, the institutional structure of the
148. Id. at 991.
149. See Michael Leiserson, Separation of Powers: A New Approach, 22 GONZ. L. REV.
423, 433–35 (1987) (describing the different powers of the branches of government).
150. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 29, at 264.
151. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
152. See Separation of Powers—An Overview, supra note 31.
153. See, e.g., Michael J. Ellis, The Origins of the Elected Prosecutor, 121 YALE L.J.
1528, 1569 (2012) (containing an appendix on how each state admitted to the Union by the
Civil War elects district attorneys).
154. See id. (noting that many state legislatures have turned state attorneys into elected
officials).
155. See Claire Kowalick, House Bill 2384 Boosts Pay for Texas Judges, Prosecutors,
TIMES REC. NEWS (Aug. 23, 2019, 6:28 PM CT), https://www.timesrecordnews.
com/story/news/local/2019/08/23/salaries-texas-judges-prosecutors-get-boost-house-bill2384/2097334001/; Cindy Swirko, Young Prosecutors, Public Defenders Get Pay Boost,
GAINESVILLE SUN (May 8, 2019, 4:29 PM), https://www.gainesville.com/news/20190508/
young-prosecutors-public-defenders-get-pay-boost.
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state’s prosecutorial authority is often defined by the legislature in
statutes.156 Legislatures can expand or contract the oversight to which
prosecutors must submit.157 In some states, like Florida, governors exercise
significant authority over state prosecutors, including, for example, the
ability to take cases away from local prosecutors for cause. 158
In this context, it is important to note that these checks operate better, not
worse, when prosecutors can be explicit about how they will use their
authority. The legislature can respond if it concludes a prosecutor is abusing
their discretion—even if the prosecutor is making enforcement decisions on
a case-by-case basis. But if the prosecutor wants to elucidate the rules that
will guide their discretion, that additional information can only help checks
and balances operate. There is no guarantee prosecutors will use rule-based
decision-making processes or announce them if they do use them. But at
least a functional approach will permit them to do so should they choose.
Moreover, there is no guarantee that this process will lead to less aggressive
prosecutions. But, again as with voters, the people through their legislature
have the right to the criminal justice system they want, within constitutional
bounds.
Allowing prosecutors to describe any formal rules they will use to
govern their discretion also has a third advantage: the announcement of
such rules can contribute to broader debates about the best strategies for
addressing criminal justice issues beyond the prosecutor’s own jurisdiction.
Just as states can act as laboratories of democracy, so too can local
jurisdictions, but only if other jurisdictions are aware of the policies being
used.159 Consider, in this context, the nationwide attention that Ayala
brought to the death penalty.160 When Aramis Ayala decided to stop
pursuing the death penalty in cases within her jurisdiction, the political
system sprang into action. Her imposition of a blanket rule sparked a
contentious debate in Florida—and across the nation—over the
appropriateness of her decision. 161
156. Jeffrey Bellin, The Power of Prosecutors, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV. 171, 184 (2019)
(“[Prosecutor’s] powers depend on an enforceable statute enacted by the legislature.”).
157. Id.
158. See Ayala v. Scott, 224 So. 3d 755, 759 (Fla. 2017).
159. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
160. See Frances Robles & Alan Blinder, Florida Prosecutor Takes a Bold Stand Against
Death Penalty, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 16, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/16/us/
orlando-prosecutor-will-no-longer-seek-death-penalty.html.
161. Joint Response, supra note 17, at 8 n.1 (“A search of LexisNexis’s News Database,
limited to the eight-month period spanning Ayala’s campaign, yields 1,472 articles in which
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Conclusion
The broader context of the contest between Aramis Ayala and the Florida
Governor encapsulates many of the main arguments made by this Article.
After Ayala announced her decision to not seek the death penalty in any
cases in her jurisdiction, the governor exercised his authority to reassign
several of Ayala’s cases. In response, Ayala called on the courts. She filed
an emergency petition for a writ of quo warranto, arguing that the
Governor’s action was an abuse of power.162 After consideration, the
Florida Supreme Court disagreed and upheld the Governor’s decision. 163
Ayala tried to take control of those cases back by forming a board that
would decide whether a case should be considered for the death penalty. 164
Each of those steps received significant attention from the press, both local
and national, and the Florida legislature. 165 These events also contributed to
Ayala’s decision not to run for re-election, and will likely be an issue in the
election for her replacement.
The ultimate impact of Ayala’s fight and the debates that followed are
unclear. But it is clear that her decision to announce a generally applicable,
prospective rule mobilized two of the most powerful constraints on
prosecutorial discretion: the democratic process and checks and balances.
Ayala did not encroach upon the authority of other branches of government
or threaten the individual liberty of voters by announcing that the death
penalty would not be applied in her jurisdiction. Instead, she focused the
attention of the governor, legislature, and voters on existing death penalty
practices. She thus subjected her office and its exercise of prosecutorial
discretion to heightened public and government scrutiny. She empowered
other branches and voters to check her discretion by telling them what she
would do. She also contributed to a growing national debate on the state of
the term ‘Florida’ appears in the same sentence as the term ‘death penalty’ or ‘capital
punishment.’”).
162. Id. at 757.
163. Id. at 759.
164. Gal Tziperman Lotan, Ayala Won’t Seek 29 Death-Penalty Cases Back in OrangeOsceola Counties, ORLANDO SENTINEL (Aug. 31, 2017), https://www.orlando
sentinel.com/news/breaking-news/os-ayala-scott-death-penalty-supreme-court-20170831story.html.
165. Monivette Cordeiro, State Attorney Aramis Ayala Agrees to Pursue Death Penalty
in Future, ORLANDO WEEKLY (Sept. 2, 2017, 12:33 PM), https://www.orlandoweekly.
com/Blogs/archives/2017/09/02/state-attorney-aramis-ayala-agrees-to-pursue-death-penaltyin-future.
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our criminal justice system in general, and the death penalty in particular.166
Ayala’s decision to announce a generally applicable, prospective rule did
not violate the separation of powers; it allowed it to operate effectively.
Ayala’s behavior in office may not have been ideal. It would have been
preferable for her to announce her intention not to seek the death penalty
during her campaign. But her decision to provide a clear description of how
she would use her prosecutorial discretion, why she would use it that
way, 167 and why she had the authority to do it,168 should be celebrated, not
condemned. Yet condemnation is exactly what a formal approach to
separation of powers has convinced state courts to do. Courts now treat
generally applicable, prospective rules as violations of separation of powers
rather than the proper exercise of prosecutorial discretion, a choice that
undermines rather than strengthens the norms the separation of powers is
meant to advance.
This Article has shown another way. A functional approach to the
separation of powers could allow prosecutors to announce and explain how
they will use their authority. It could encourage frankness by prosecutors,
who could describe how they will use their discretion. It would avoid the
perverse incentives of the formal approach, which encourages prosecutors
to obscure their policy choices behind a smokescreen of case-by-case
analysis. Allowing this frankness does not undermine executive, legislative,
or judicial power. It provides governors, legislators, and judges the
information they need to check abuses of prosecutorial discretion. It gives
voters the same opportunity. It permits the separation of powers to operate
to protect liberty and allow efficient government. Formal approaches
undermine those mechanisms by hiding the information voters and
government actors need to check prosecutorial discretion. They protect
neither individual liberty nor government efficiency. They should be
abandoned.
166. See, e.g., Debbie Elliott, Florida Governor Pulls Murder Cases from Prosecutor
Who Shuns Death Penalty, NPR (Apr. 3, 2017, 7:37 PM ET), https://www.npr.org/
sections/thetwo-way/2017/04/03/522372829/florida-governor-pulls-murder-cases-fromprosecutor-who-shuns-death-penalty.
167. Sarah Wilson, ‘Time for Me to Move Forward’: State Attorney Aramis Ayala Won’t
Run for Re-Election, WFTV 9 (May 28, 2019, 10:40 PM), https://www.wftv.com/news/
local/time-for-me-to-move-forward-state-attorney-aramis-ayala-says-she-wont-run-for-reelection/952980586 (“Under my administration I will not be seeking the death penalty in
cases handled in my office.”) (quoting Ayala).
168. See id.
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